Op-Ed: “The ‘European Spring’ in the Defence Era: Defending Pax Europeae Through Deterrence and Long-Term Planning?”

This Op-Ed is part of the EU Law Live symposium on the EU’s Defence Union. See also Op-Eds by Ramses Wessel, Ulla Neegaard, and Steven Blockmans. More Op-Eds on this topic will follow soon on EU Law Live.

‘The only way we can ensure European peace is to have the readiness to deter whose who would do us harm’.

To justify a significant increase in European defence spending, the European Union refers to the Pax Europaea, for whose protection it is necessary to shift to a defence-readiness mindset and deterrence by 2030.

What is interesting to note is how the ‘Defence Readiness Omnibus’ refers to different nuances of ‘defence readiness’, which on the one hand takes on the characteristic of the ‘ability of Member States to anticipate, prevent and respond to defence-related crises’ – leaning towards an idea of deterrence only – on the other hand refers to ‘readiness in case of conflict’.

The two definitions appear at odds with each other: if deterrence is to be interpreted as the act of discouraging a harmful event and European defence spending serves this purpose, then ‘readiness in case of conflict’ is a specific component of deterrence, referring to the exact capability to respond to a threat.

Deterrence and readiness for conflict are two sides of the same coin, but are not interchangeable: the readiness of a State to deploy forces increases the credibility of a deterrence threat, but it is a means to an end, not the end itself.

However, in this context, it seems logical and evident that the casus belli that has led to such an increase in defence spending and a renewed need for protection is Russia’s unjustified aggression against Ukraine in 2022. Given the highly intensive conflict at Europe’s borders and Russia’s aggressive posture, the Union must rely on the Preparedness Union strategy and the Defence Readiness Omnibus proposals of 2025 to set out a package of measures to remove barriers and incentivise cooperation in defence procurement, funding, and industrial coordination.

For instance, among the new developments aimed at expanding support to defence production, the Commission interpreted that Member States can deviate from standard single-market regulations for essential security interests.

Indeed, State aid can be directed towards defence production without compromising the fairness of competition or the evaluation of Article 346 TFEU, since investments in defence product and service production capacity are typically seen as supporting important security interests.

Specifically, government expenditures for essential dual-use infrastructure or basic military requirements (e.g. strengthening bridges for tank transportation) would not be regarded as illegal state aid. Simultaneously, the Commission has promoted the use of the General Block Exemption Regulation (651/2014) to allow help for internal market-compatible defence production and research. Suppose it does not significantly alter trading circumstances against the common good. In that case, the Commission may see help intended to support the growth of specific economic activities as compliant with state aid regulations.

Defence readiness-focused cases will be given priority, and the Commission’s evaluation will ensure that the State’s assistance is required, appropriate, and doesn’t result in overcompensation.

On another point, the Omnibus plan aims to reform the defence public procurement law to speed up joint procurement and reduce administrative barriers. To enable additional projects to be carried out without the need for drawn-out EU-wide bidding procedures, the Commission has called for revising the Defence Procurement Directive (2009/81/EC) to significantly boost contract value thresholds, such as for defence supply contracts, from €413,000 to €900,000. The proposed changes would increase the use of the ‘dynamic purchasing system’ and innovation partnerships for innovative projects, as well as incorporate more flexible processes, such as open and negotiated tenders. One particularly significant proposal is a temporary exemption that allows Member States to jointly procure military equipment until 2030 using a negotiated procedure without prior publication, thereby speeding up collaborative acquisitions. This would facilitate the kind of large-scale joint orders the EU is attempting, such as recent initiatives to aggregate demand for ammunition and air defence systems among several Member States. In conjunction with these initiatives, the maximum length of defence framework contracts will be extended from seven to ten years, facilitating longer-term cooperative projects and simplifying burdensome reporting obligations that have historically hindered cross-border procurement. The cumulative effect of these legal modifications is intended to eliminate bureaucratic hurdles and promote collaborative procurement among Member States, enabling them to achieve larger economies of scale.

Among the new funding mechanisms, in March 2025, the Commission introduced the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) draft Regulation proposed loan fund designed to support the financing of crucial European defence capabilities such as air and missile defence, cyber resilience, and secure communications via space. Similar to the EU recovery fund established after the COVID-19 pandemic, the SAFE instrument would enable the EU to generate capital and provide long-term loans to Member States for defence initiatives, with the interest expenses being distributed at the EU level. At the same time, the European Investment Bank has broadened its lending authority for the first time to incorporate specific dual-use and defence-related initiatives (excluding lethal equipment), thereby opening an additional avenue for affordable financing to meet Europe’s security requirements.

Cooperative projects ranging from innovative materials to artificial intelligence are already co-financed by the European Defence Fund. Furthermore, the European Investment Bank and the Commission established the European Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS) and a venture capital fund specifically for small and medium-sized defence-tech businesses to overcome the ‘valley of death’: The critical early stage of development when private financiers often deem such ventures too risky to fund.

Additionally, the rules regarding debt under the Stability and Growth Pact are being interpreted with greater flexibility to allow for increased defence expenditures: The Council of the EU has initiated a request for activation of the national ‘escape clause’ for military investments at the beginning of 2025. EU cohesion funds and unallocated amounts from the Recovery Fund are being redirected towards enhancing military mobility and upgrading infrastructure that can serve both civilian and military purposes, thereby blurring the conventional legal distinctions between economic development and defence goals. Collectively, these policy and legal advancements indicate a new approach: Leveraging the EU’s internal market and budgetary powers to bolster the EU’s role in defence.

Moreover, the European Defence Technology Industrial Base (EDTIB) requires significant funding and innovation to maintain supply security — areas where competitiveness goals and current EU measures converge. Now that European countries are increasing their defence budgets with a defence investment pledge of at least 2% of GDP, the EU is attempting to direct some of the funds into cutting-edge European businesses and research facilities.

The EU is focused on streamlining regulations to have the greatest possible impact. Proposals to reduce export restrictions and enhance intellectual property laws for dual-use research are on the horizon, following a White Paper on promoting dual-use R&D that identified fragmented regulations and unnecessary bureaucracy as barriers to innovation. Furthermore, the Commission is considering establishing a European version of the American Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), to conduct high-risk, high-reward defence research initiatives with greater flexibility than typical EU projects. It highlights a change in perspective: Viewing defence industrial prowess as a pillar of both security and economic policy. If established, such an agency would likely require the consent of Member States and substantial financial commitments.

To conclude, the Union is taking action on several fronts, addressing an ‘overly complex’ defence procurement, outlining a new funding mechanism, and providing support to enterprises.

Although it appears that the EU is experiencing a ‘European spring’ in the defence sector, the effectiveness of the proposed simplifications and whether they eventually result in concrete simplification remains debatable.

It remains to be seen whether, in fact, the outlined simplifications will prove effective and whether, in the long term, they will result in concrete simplification.

The EU is doing everything possible to make its legislative means and programmes ready for use. However, in the end, the ultimate efficacy of these measures will depend on the willingness and discretion of the Member States to effectively utilise and operationalise these instruments.